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Abstract 
This research objective is to test whether the corruption perception index (CPI), 
and country risk index, both as a macro economic variable, could affect the lead 
arranger decision for syndicated loans or the size determination for syndicated loans. 
In this research, we use logit methodology to analyze the lead arranger decision 
to approve a syndicated loans application, meanwhile to analyze the size 
determination, we used tobit model analysis. The sample for this research came from 
all recorded loan transaction in Asia during 1999-2003. To strenghten the research 
analysis, we also apply robustnest check with an ordinary least square method. 
 From this research, it is showed that the lead arranger consider their reputation 
and certification effect as an important factor that lead them to prefer a low risk 
syndicated loans. For size determintation, lead arranger will decide a higher size for a 
higher risk loan, since they expect a higher return as a risk compensation for the 
investment.  
 
Keywords: corruption, country risk, loan, syndication 
 
A. Introduction  
A syndicated loan according to Armstrong (2003) is a type of loan that is 
provided by atleast two lenders to provide financial capital for one borrower. In 
syndicated loan, there is a lender that play role as a lead arranger, while the other take 
a role as a participant lender, both have different roles and functions (Sufi, 2004).  
Lead arranger will be in charge to arrange the whole process in syndicated loan. After 
the borrower and the lead arranger made an agreement, the lead arranger will launch 
the deal to invite other investor (Dennis and Mullineaux, 1999).  
The unique factor of syndicated loan is that the transaction exist between 
relationship banking and transactional banking (Altunbaset al.(2009), Dennis and 
Mullineaux,1999). Relationship banking is a long term relationship between borrower 
and lender, where the lender continually gathering information regarding the 
borrower, in order to minimize the risk of agency problem, moral hazard and adverse 
selection, that involved in syndicated loan. Meanwhile, the transactional banking is a 
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relationship between lender and borrower for a temporary term and the information 
needed is more conditional. Based on those two relationships explained above, the 
lender and borrower relationship in syndicated loan is in relationship banking context, 
and while the syndicated loan proportion from several lenders is in transactional 
banking context. 
Starting in 1970s, the syndicated loans only represent a small amount of money 
to lend. But on 1982, the total amount reach $46 billion, and keep growing from 
1990s until 2003, with a total transaction $1,6 trillion. The growing rate showed how 
syndicated loans had become an important financial capital source for companies.  
This phenomena attract Godlewski and Weill (2007), Joneset al.(2000) to do 
research on lenders motivation to syndicated their loans. The first reason is to 
diversify the credit risk and their income. The second reason is to avoid bank 
regulation related to maximum loan limit for one borrower, and the third reason is to 
give an opportunity for a lender with less capability arranging an agreement, and the 
fourth one is to improve the reputation of the lead arranger. 
Some research done by Dennis and mullineaux (1999), Marciano (2003), also 
Godlewski and Weill (2007) conclude that syndicated loan has two problems on loan 
agreement arrangement, which are agency issue, and asymmetric information issue. 
The asymmetric information issue laid on the differences on information 
control between the lead arranger and participant lender that caused adverse selection 
problem. The other issue, moral hazard shows the lack of agent commitment to 
pursue the principal objective, in this case the lead arranger as the agent, did not 
perform optimally using the authority that has been delegated by the participant 
lender. 
To describe the moral hazard on this research, we will use the corruption 
perception index (CPI), since the corruption perception index of a country also 
represent the borrower’s moral hazard. The high rate of corruption perception index 
shows the common practice of bribe and misused fundings in the bureaucrat, which 
could lead to borrower false action such as issuing a misleading financial report, false 
tax report, etc. This situation could produce a higher risk level for loan assessment. If 
a lead arranger provides syndicated loans to a country with high corruption 
perception index, it means that the lead arranger did not distribute the moral hazard 
risk to the participant lender. 
The previous argumentation is supported by Leland and Pyle (1977), which 
said that there is a tendency that the lead arranger will prefer to give syndicated loans 
to a higher moral hazard loan. But in the contrary, other research conduct by Dennis 
and Mullineauz (1999), shows that the higher the moral hazard means the lower the 
possibility for the lead arranger to give syndicated loans, since they are more concern 
on their reputation and their certification level. 
CPI (corruption perception index) itself shows the perception rate in a country, 
from 0-10, based on survey among the businessman and analyst in particular country. 
The 0 scale means that the businessman and analyst in particular country have a very 
high corruption perception, while the 10 scale means the opposite. 
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  Other than moral hazard issue, the lenders will also need to evaluate the credit 
risk imply. A credit risk is a risk of borrower’s incapability to perform their duties as 
stated in loan agreement (Jorion, 2002; p.16, Heffernan, 2008; p.104, Eaton et al., 
1894). Based on Damodaran (2003), a country risk could also describe the credit risk 
level of the borrower, and the credit risk will grow according to the business risk in a 
country. Several business risks that could be complicated are political stability, 
government policy in business, etc. Other research on credit risk by Dennis and 
Mullineaux (1999), Godlewski and Weill (2007) stated that a higher credit risk in a 
company credit rating will motivate the lead arranger to approve syndicated loans. 
The definition for a country risk is an index to estimate a risk of a country 
based on their credit and political stability risk, with an interval from 0-7, with the 
scale of 0 indicate the lowest rate for a country risk, while the scale of 7, indicate the 
highest country risk rate. 
Most research that has been done to analyze moral hazard and credit risk, 
usually use firm specific data (Dennis and mullineaux, 1999; Nigro, et al. 2000; Sufi, 
2004; Mody and Ichengreen 2000). While research with country specific data like 
what Godlewski and Weill (2007) done is still very rarely to use. That is why in this 
research, we will use a country specific data, such as corruption perception index 
(CPI) and country risk. This is relevant with the fact that in macro economic theory, 
the aggregate macro economic behavior could be seen in macro economic dynamic 
(Case and Fair, 2005), and it is necessary to use macro economic performance as a 
consideration for lenders to approve syndicated loans to a borrower in a particular 
country.  
 
B. Literature review 
 
The corruption perception index of a country could affect the lender arranger 
decision whether to approve or not a syndicated loans application, as well will also 
affect the size involved. This is relevant with the fact that in micro economic theory, 
the aggregate micro economic behavior could be seen in macro economic dynamic 
(Case and Fair, 2005).  
Corruption is a person behavior to take a personal advantage or also a group 
advantage from a company transaction, by misuse his authority or power that caused 
a country to suffer a financial lost (Ardisasmita, 2006). Corruption could be done in 
terms of: (1) causing financial lost to a country (2) bribery (3) fraud (4) black mail (5) 
cheating (6) conflict of interest (7) gratification. 
Corruption in Indonesia also being regulated in Law of the Republic of 
Indonesia No. 31/ 1999 jo. No. 20/ 2001 and considering any actions below as a 
corruption action 
1. Interfering in corruption case. 
2. Keep silent or giving misleading information related to a corruption case 
3. Bank policy to protect their client account 
4. Witness that giving a false testimony 
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5. A professional protecting their client information or giving a false testimony 
6. A witness that reveal the informant identity 
The high rate of corruption perception index shows the common practice of 
bribe and misused fundings in the bureaucrat, which could lead to borrower false 
action such as issuing a misleading financial report, false tax report, etc, that against 
the Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 31/ 1999 jo. No. 20/ 2001. When the 
borrower perform those actions, means he have a high moral hazard issue, and will 
cause financial lost for a country, or could impact on financial lost for the lenders. 
Based on that explanation, the borrower moral hazard rate is one of the factors 
that need to be considered by the lenders on syndicated loans. Face with this 
situation, the lenders have a dilemma between syndicated the loans to diversify the 
risk, or self financing the loan in order to maintain their reputation.  
There are still a lot of factors that need to be further discussed about the impact 
of the moral hazard on lead arranger decision making for syndicated loans since the 
theories and empirical study shows different results. In Leland and Pyle (1977), “the 
more favorable the insider’s information, the larger the number of shares they retain”. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) stated that there is support evidence that the higher risk 
involve in a loan, the lead arranger will diversify/ divide/ reduce the risk. It means 
that the lead arranger will choose to syndicated loans in a case where the borrower 
have a high moral hazard risk, and will prefer to do self financing the loan for a 
borrower with a low moral hazard risk. 
Meanwhile the empirical study conducted by Jones, et al (2000); Dennis and 
Mullineaux (1999) shows a different result from Lyland and Pyle (1977), where the 
lead arranger will choose not to syndicating loans for a borrower with a high moral 
hazard in order to maintain their reputation (Jones, et al. 2000). 
A proxy level for a country corruption rate is represented by Corruption 
perception index or CPI. CPI could give a description of the borrower moral hazard 
rate, like what Case and Fair (2005) said that the aggregate micro economic behavior 
could be seen in macro economic dynamic. CPI (corruption perception index) itself 
shows the perception rate in a country, from 0-10, based on survey among the 
businessman and analyst in particular country. The 0 scale means that the 
businessman and analyst in particular country have a very high corruption perception, 
while the 10 scale means the opposite. A lower CPI means a higher moral hazard rate 
and higher chance that the loan will be syndicated, while a lower moral hazard rate 
also reduce the opportunity that the loan will be syndicated. 
H1 :CPI have a negative relationship with syndicated loans decision 
 
There are still a lot of factors that need to be further discussed about the impact 
of the moral hazard on syndicated loans size since the theories and empirical study 
shows different results. In Leland and Pyle (1977), “the more favorable the insider’s 
information, the larger the number of shares they retain”. Leland and Pyle (1977) 
stated that the higher risk of the borrower’s moral hazard, the lead arranger will form 
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a bigger syndicate, while for a low moral hazard risk the lead arranger will form a 
smaller syndicate. 
 
While on the research conducted by Jones, et al. (2000) it is clear that the lead 
arranger also consider their reputation and certification effect for syndicated loans 
decision. It means that according to Jones, et al. (2000), the lead arranger will form a 
smaller syndicate when facing a higher risk of moral hazard, and will form a bigger 
syndicate when facing a lower risk of moral hazard. 
A proxy level for a country corruption rate is represented by Corruption 
perception index or CPI. CPI could give a description of the borrower moral hazard 
rate, like what Case and Fair (2005) said that the aggregate micro economic behavior 
could be seen in macro economic dynamic. CPI (corruption perception index) itself 
shows the perception rate in a country, from 0-10, based on survey among the 
businessman and analyst in particular country. The 0 scale means that the 
businessman and analyst in particular country have a very high corruption perception, 
while the 10 scale means the opposite. A lower CPI means a higher moral hazard rate 
and a higher size of the syndicate, while a lower moral hazard rate will also also 
reduce the size of the syndicate. 
H2 : CPI have a negative relationship with size determination for syndicated 
loans. 
 
In their book, Jorion, (2002; p.16), Heffernan, (2008; p.104), Eaton et al., 
(1894) it is stated that a credit risk is a risk of borrower’s incapability to perform their 
duties as stated in loan agreement, which means that the borrower could not paid the 
loans because of bankruptcy, or late payment for loan’s interest. This situation is 
explained by Hanafi (2009) caused by external environment incertainty. Damodaran 
(2003), also stated that the credit risk is highly related with the business risk where 
the borrower conduct their business. As a conclusion, the higher credit risk rate for a 
country, also represent the higher credit risk rate for the borrower. 
 A proxy level for a country credit risk could be seen from the country risk rate. 
Country risk is an index to estimate a risk of a country based on their credit and 
political stability risk, with an interval from 0-7, with the scale of 0 indicate the 
lowest rate for a country risk, while the scale of 7, and indicate the highest country 
risk rate. The higher country risk rate shows the higher external environment 
incertainty, which lead to a higher credit risk for the lenders. When the credit risk rate 
of the borrower increasing, then the lead arranger tend to not syndicating the loans, 
and vice versa. It is align with theory said by Lyland and Pyle (1977), stated that 
disadvantage information, in terms of country risk, will affect the lead arranger 
decision to syndicating the loans. 
H3 :country risk have a positive relationship with the lead arranger decision to 
syndicating the loans 
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In their book, Jorion, (2002; p.16), Heffernan, (2008; p.104), Eaton et al., 
(1894) it is stated that a credit risk is a risk of borrower’s incapability to perform their 
duties as stated in loan agreement, which means that the borrower could not paid the 
loans because of bankruptcy, or late payment for loan’s interest. This situation is 
explained by Hanafi (2009) caused by external environment incertainty. Damodaran 
(2003), also stated that the credit risk is highly related with the business risk where 
the borrower conduct their business. As a conclusion, the higher credit risk rate for a 
country, also represent the higher credit risk rate for the borrower. 
A proxy level for a country credit risk could be seen from the country risk rate. 
Country risk is an index to estimate a risk of a country based on their credit and 
political stability risk, with an interval from 0-7, with the scale of 0 indicate the 
lowest rate for a country risk, while the scale of 7, and indicate the highest country 
risk rate. The higher country risk rate shows the higher external environment 
incertainty, which lead to a higher credit risk for the lenders. When the credit risk rate 
of the borrower increasing, then the lead arranger tend to self financing the loans, and 
when the credit risk rate of the borrower decreasing, the lead arranger will form a 
bigger size of the syndicate. It is align with theory said by Lyland and Pyle (1977), 
stated that disadvantage information, in terms of country risk, will affect the lead 
arranger decision to syndicating the loans. 
H4 : country risk have a positive relationship with size determination for 
syndicated loans. 
 
Godlewski and Weill (2007) stated that the use of a ticker shows he borrower 
transparency rate, and could reduce the monitoring cost. The first thing that we will 
discuss is transparency, an assumption related to the efficiency to access information 
and data about the borrower. Especially for a public company listed in a stock 
exchange, it is cumpolsary to issue a financial statement periodically and to issue a 
report to the public regarding the corporate action that has been taken. These 
procedures will make the information gathering about the borrower become easier. 
For participant lender, this also could reduce the moral hazard risk since they could 
also access information outside the information gathered by the lead arranger. This 
situation will also affect the lead arranger decision making in terms to prioritize a 
syndicated loans for public company that is listed in stock exchange, as it is more 
favorable for participant lender in terms of information transparency. 
Other than that, in Mulleneaux, Dennis (2000), it is also stated that a public 
company that is listed in stock exchange could also reduce the monitoring cost. With 
a periodic financial statement and corporate action report, it will be easier for the 
lenders to check the borrower’s performance, which will make the lead arranger 
prefer to syndicate the loan. 
The impact of maturity role is also still confusing (Weill, Godlewski (2007)). In 
Dennis and Mullineaux (1999) research, they conclude that if there is a significant 
potency from the lead arranger to perform moral hazard in syndicated loans, then a 
short term maturity syndicate could minimize the problem. It is because a short term 
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maturity syndicate will results in a more frequent due time payment extension request 
by the borrower, and cause a more frequent monitoring activities by the participant 
lender, which in the end could help to minimize the moral hazard issue, so that the 
lead arranger will syndicate the loan. 
But in other side, the more frequent monitoring activities will also results in a 
higher monitoring cost. In Diamon (1984) it is stated that in a syndicated loans 
usually will involve a duplicative monitoring cost. If this is relevant, then a long term 
maturity will reduce the lead arranger potency to syndicate the loan, and vice versa. 
 The definition of collateral in Winton and Rajan (1995) is as a “specific assets 
pledged as security for a loan”. Collateral is use to reduce or increase the potency for 
syndicate the loan.  Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) stated that the 
borrower could have a good credit risk quality by offering a collateral. It is also 
explained that when a loan already fully secured, then the monitoring quality by the 
lead arranger is become less important. Collateral could also reduce the sensitivity of 
a loan cash flow in dealing with different information control among the lead arranger 
and the participant lender, which means that with collateral the borrower will be more 
likely to get a syndicated loans. 
Berger, Udell (1990) associated collateral with a riskier loans, since collateral 
usually are found in a loan transaction that need more monitoring. If collateral really 
play an important role to solve the moral hazard problem, then the higher risk that the 
borrower have, means that he will need more collateral. In the contrary, they believe 
that collateral will only reduce the opportunity for syndicated loans. 
The other problem about the maximum limit amount of loan that could be given 
for one borrower, and the need to diversify the portfolio to reduce the credit risk, will 
also affect the possibility for syndicated loans. This could be measure from the total 
amount of loan in one loan agreement. The higher total amount of loan means the 
higher potency for syndicated loans since the lead arranger will have issue about loan 
amount limitation and also credit risk issue (Dennis and Mullineaux (1999)).  
  
C. Method 
C.1. Variable operational definition 
CPI corruption perception rate in a country based on survey 
among the businessman and analyst in particular country  
COUNTRY_RISK country risk index based on credit risk and political 
instability risk in particular country 
LISTED  dummy variable that have a value as 1 (one) if the 
borrower company listed in stock exchange (go public 
company), and the value is 0 (zero) if it’s not listed in 
stock exchange (private company). 
Log (AMOUNT) logarithm of loan amount in US dollar denomination. 
TENOR variable that indicate the time period for a loan (monthly) 
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SECURED dummy variable that have a value as 1 (one) for a loan with 
collateral, and the value is 0 (zero) for a loan without 
collateral 
INDUSTRY a group of dummy variable consist of 9 type of industries 
based on the borrower SIC primer code.  
 
YEAR a group of dummy variable that shows the year of loan 
transaction. Y99 means that the transaction happen in 
1999, while Y2000 means it happen in 2000, etc. 
COUNTRY indicate a group of dummy variable that shows the country 
of the borrower’s origin, i.e.: China, Hongkong, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Philipines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. 
SYNDICATED dummy variable with a value of 1 (one) for syndicated 
loans, and 0 (zero) for loans that is not being syndicated. 
NUMBER variable amount of the lenders involve in a syndicate  
 
C.2. Data 
Data that are used for this research are a secondary data, gather not from the 
first source i.e. survey and direct interview, but came from internet, etc. The data 
source on this research came from Dealscan database and Osiris database. For the 
loan transaction data, we gather the information from Dealscan database, while for 
loan transaction data for big corporation, we gather it from Loan Pricing Corporation 
(LPC). LPC is a private company that collects all loan transaction for their 
institutional client. Dealscan also have historical database information consist of price 
and loan agreement information more than 15 years ago. And for company status 
whether they are listed in stock exchange or not, are collected from Osiris database 
that could be access from Universitas Surabaya elibrary. 
 
The procedure for data processing is started by making a dummies variable as 
below: (1) LISTED (2) SECURED (3) TENOR (4) INDUSTRY (5) SYNDICATED 
(6) COUNTRY (7) YEAR. After that the logarithm calculation will process the 
AMOUNT variable for a smaller result, and will combine those data with NUMBER 
variable. After all the nada needed has been collected, then we will use it to test the 
model in two groups, i.e.: (1) all loans transaction (2) syndicated loans transaction. 
The model for testing will be adjusted based on data collected for each group. 
The first test for all loans transaction is to see whether the moral hazard and 
credit risk factors will affect the lead arranger decision to syndicated loans. In this 
test, industry independent variable SIC 0 and period independent variable is T1999 
are the constanta. The model could be seen below: 
SYNDICATED = β0  + β1 CPI + β2 TENOR + β3 SECURED + βyear PERIOD + βSIC 
INDUSTRY + β6 Log (AMOUNT) + β7TICKER 
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SYNDICATED = α0  + α1 COUNT_RISK + α2 TENOR + α3 SECURED + αyear 
PERIOD + αSIC INDUSTRY + α6 Log (AMOUNT) + α7TICKER 
The second test for syndicated loans is to see whether the moral hazard and 
credit risk factors will affect the size of loans. In this test, industry independent 
variable SIC 0 and period independent variable is T1999 are the constanta. The model 
could be seen below: 
NUMBER = σ0  + σ1 CPI + σ2 TENOR + σ3 SECURED + σyear PERIOD + σSIC 
INDUSTRY + σ6 Log (AMOUNT) + σ7TICKER 
NUMBER = ε0 + ε1 COUNT_RISK + ε2 TENOR + ε3 SECURED + εyear PERIOD + 
εSIC INDUSTRY + ε6 Log (AMOUNT) + ε7TICKER 
 
This research using two models, logit and tobit to estimate the determinant 
factor for syndicated loans in multivariate context (Winarno, 2009). The logit model 
is a regression model use to analyze a dependent variable with a possibility between 0 
and 1 (Winarno, 2009). The logit could be different based on the data. Two types of 
logit analysis is an individual data and a group data. 
The tobit model is use to analyze using different information to form two 
unequal group of data (Winarno, 2009). The dependent variable is called censored 
model with a limited condition. 
Heterokedasticity is controlled using White method (1980). White (1980) 
reduce heterokedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator and provide the right 
estimation for varians coefisien, when there is an unknown heterokedasticity. 
 
D. Analysis 
Data on table 4.1 shows the data division of 673 corporate loans in Asia during 
1999-2003. The total data of loan transaction are divided by syndicated loans and non 
syndicated loans. There are 486 syndicated loans, or 72,21% from the total 
transaction, while there are only 187 non syndicated loans or 27,79%. The 
composition between borrower that are listed in stock exchange, and those who are 
not listed, is almost equal. There are 335 or 49,77% out of 673 companies that are not 
listed in stock exchange, while there are 338 or 50,22% companies that are listed in 
stock exchange.  For the borrower that are listed in stock exchange, there are 246 or 
72,78% out of 338 companies that involved in syndicated loans. While there are only 
92 or 27,22% companies with non syndicated loans. And even for the borrower that 
are not listed in stock exchange, 71,64% or 240 companies out of 335, are involved in 
syndicated loans, while there are only 28,36% or 95 companies that involved in non 
syndicated loans. From a total of 673 borrower that involved in loan transaction, there 
are 43,38% or 292 companies with collateral, while 56,61% or 381 companies did not 
provide collateral for loan transaction.From 292 companies that provide collateral, 
there are 224 companies or 76,71% syndicated loans and there are only 92 companies 
or 27,22% with non syndicated loans. From 381 companies that did not provide 
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collateral, there are 262 companies or 68,77% syndicated loand, and there are only 
119 companies or 31,23% with non syndicated loans. 
 
 
 
Table 4.1 
Descriptive Statistic on corporate loans in Asia 1999-2003 
  All syndicated 
loans 
non syndicated 
loans 
Syndicated 
loans (%) 
Non syndicated 
loans (%) 
number of tranches 673 486 187 72,21% 27,79% 
syndicated loans 486 486 - - - 
non syndicated 
loans 
187 - 187 - - 
non listed 335 240 95 71,64% 28,36% 
listed 338 246 92 72,78% 27,22% 
secured 292 224 68 76,71% 23,29% 
non secured 381 262 119 68,77% 31,23% 
industry        
inds0 10 8 2 1,65% 1,07% 
inds1 55 49 6 10,08% 3,21% 
inds2 91 57 34 11,73% 18,18% 
inds3 168 128 40 26,34% 21,39% 
inds4 292 215 77 44,24% 41,18% 
inds5 17 12 5 2,47% 2,67% 
inds6 14 6 8 1,23% 4,28% 
inds7 17 5 12 1,03% 6,42% 
inds8 9 6 3 1,23% 1,60% 
period        
T1999 170 122 48 25,10% 25,67% 
T2000 173 125 48 25,72% 25,67% 
T2001 167 118 49 24,28% 26,20% 
T2002 90 72 18 14,81% 9,63% 
t2003 73 49 24 10,08% 12,83% 
CPI        
mean 5,11 5 5,4 - - 
median 5 4,5 5 - - 
Max 8 8 8 - - 
Min 4 4 4 - - 
st.dev 1,40 1,28 1,72 - - 
country risk        
mean 1,83 1,74 2,08 - - 
median 2 2 2 - - 
Max 6 6 6 - - 
Min 0 0 0 - - 
st.dev 1,49 1,39 1,69 - - 
number of lender        
mean 5,88 7,76 1 - - 
median 4 6 1 - - 
Max 45 45 1 - - 
Min 1 2 1 - - 
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st.dev 5,75 5,75 0 - - 
tenor        
mean 67,21 67,10 67,49 - - 
median 60 60 60 - - 
Max 360 360 300 - - 
Min 1 2 1 - - 
st.dev 47,35 46,40 49,87 - - 
Amount(million $)        
mean 263,98 306,77 152,76 - - 
median 110,00 125,00 90,00 - - 
Max 12000,00 12000,00 2252,00 - - 
Min 1,6 6,52 16,00 - - 
st.dev 738,86 853,95 231,53 - - 
 
Table 4.2 
Descriptive Statistic on robustnest check in Asia 1999-2003 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data in table 4.2 shows that there are 274 data use in robust check. The mean is 
146,035, median is 125, maximum rate is 600, minimum rate is 19 and standard 
devaiation is 90. For the average rate fee is 74, median 60, maximum rate is 390, and 
minimum rate is 0, and standard deviation is 61.74. 
 
D.2. Model Testing 
This model testing are divided to 4 models using software eviews. The 1st and 
2nd tests using logit, while the 3rd and 4th tests using tobit. The 1st and 2nd test are to 
see whether the CPI and country risk affect lead arranger decision on syndicated 
loands, while the 3rd and 4th tests are to check whether the CPI and country risk affect 
the size of syndicated loans. 
 
D.2.1. All Sample 
Number of tranches 274 
Rate  
Mean 146,03 
Median 125 
Max 600 
Min 19 
st.dev 90 
Fee  
Mean 74,03 
Median 60 
Max 390 
Min 0 
st.dev 61,74 
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The test result on model 1 in table 5.1 shows that CPI variable is significant in 
l% level, with a positive coefficient. From this result, we can conclude that there is a 
significant relationship between CPI variable and the lead arranger decision for 
syndicated loans, and also there is a positive relationship between CPI variable and 
syndicated variable. 
The significant test results with a positive coefficient shows the tendency to 
syndicate the loan in a country with a high CPI rate, while for a country with a low 
CPI rate the loans usually are non syndicated. It means that the lead arranger tend to 
not syndicate the loan for borrower from a country with a high corruption rate, since 
corruption represents the high level of moral hazard issue. In the contrary, the lead 
arranger tend to syndicate the loan for borrower from a country with a low corruption 
index. From model 1, the result is not align with the theory from Lyland and Pyle 
(1977), but more supporting the empirical study by Jones, et al (2000), Dennis, 
Mullineaux  (1999). It shows that the lead arranger did not perform portfolio 
diversification when they are facing a high risk moral hazard as what Lyland and Pyle 
(1977) stated, but the lead arranger are more concern on their reputation and 
certification effect according to Jones, et al (2000), Dennis, Mullineaux  (1999). 
In model 1 test for control secured variable, the result shows a significant 
positive coefficient with 1% level. It means that control secured variable have a 
significant and positive relationship with syndicated variable. We can conclude that 
the lead arranger tend to not syndicate the loan when the borrower did not provide a 
collateral in the loan agreement. The lead arranger also tend to syndicate the loan 
when the borrower provide a collateral in the loan agreement (Bester (1985), 
Besanko, Thakor (1987)). 
Meanwhile, for the model 2 test shown in table 5.1, the result shows a 
significant negative coefficient with 1% level. It means that country risk variable 
have a significant relationship with syndicated loans decision making, and there is a 
negative relationship between country risk variable and syndicated variable. 
The significant test result with a negative coefficient, shows that the lead 
arranger will syndicate the loan in a low country risk, and non syndicated loans will 
be given for a high country risk, since the lead arranger believe that a high country 
risk also represent a high credit risk of the borrower, and vice versa. The lead 
arranger decision as showed in model 2 test is not align with the theory from Lyland 
and Pyle (1977), but more supporting the empirical study by Jones, et al (2000), 
Dennis, Mullineaux (1999). This result conclude that the lead arranger did not 
perform portfolio diversification when they are facing a high risk business condition 
as stated by Lyland and Pyle (1977), but in the contrary the lead arranger are more 
concern to maintain their reputation and certification effect which support the 
empirical study by Jones, et al (2000), Dennis, Mullineaux  (1999). 
The test result for control secured variable on model 2 shows a significant 
relationship in 1% level with a positive coefficient. It means there is a significant 
relationship between control secured variable with the lead arranger decision to 
syndicate the loan, and also shows that there is a positive relationship between control 
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secured variable and syndicated variable. This conclusion support the statement by 
(Bester (1985), Besanko, Thakor (1987)), that the lead arranger will prefer to 
syndicate the loan for a borrower that provide collateral in loan agreement, and tend 
to not syndicate the loan if the borrower did not provide a collateral in the loan 
agreement. 
 
Table 5.1 
Inferensial Statistic Data on corporate loans 
 
 dependen variable : syndication/non-syndication  
Variables 
Regression 
Coeficients 
(model1) 
Regression 
Coeficients 
(model2) 
Z-Value 
(model1) 
Z-Value 
(model2) 
CPI 0.213556*** - 4,338572  
count risk - -0.172802***  -2,610632 
L_amount 0.098753 0.082051 1,567108 1,317041 
Ticker 0.238479 0.183125 1,237019 0.967080 
Tenor -2.71E-05 -0.001161 -0.012062 -0.520479 
Secured 0.671651*** 0.563045*** 3,080134 2,702861 
T2000 0.00999 0.060726 0.038808 0.238011 
t2001 -0.112261 0.037089 -0.428340 0.143120 
T2002 0.278015 0.480343 0.812460 1,46169 
T2003 -0.769975** -0.592837* -2.182.220 -1,725821 
in_1 1.227.736 0.970137 1,337861 1,071013 
in_2 -0.485458 -0.773055 -0.588617 -0.961179 
in_3 -0.024590 -0.261059 -0.030225 -0.328326 
in_4 -0.177967 -0.261161 -0.221180 -0.331341 
in_5 -0.259356 -0.461470 -0.261848 -0.480629 
in_6 -1.787964* -1.645083* -1,852425 -1,774835 
in_7 -2.079928** -2.197548** -2,168311 -2,338554 
in_8 -0.694549 -0.693443 -0,658395 -0.677615 
 
Note : *significant 10% ; ** significant 5% ; *** significant 1%. 
 
D.2.2. Sample of Syndicated Loans 
The test result on model 3 shows that the CPI variable has an insignificant 
relationship with a positive coefficient. It means that the CPI rate did not affect the 
size of syndicated loans, and the positive coefficient means that there is an indication 
that the higher CPI rate in a country, will also increase the number of lenders involve 
in the syndicate, and vice versa. 
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While the test result on model 3 for control secured variable shows a significant 
relationship with 10% level and positive coefficient. It means that the control secured 
variable have a significant relationship with number variable. We can conclude that 
the lead arranger prefer to give a bigger size of syndicated loans when there is a 
collateral involved, and prefer to form a smaller size of syndicated loans without a 
collateral in the loan agreement. The test result support the (Bester (1985), Besanko, 
Thakor (1987)), statement about the lead arranger decision to syndicate the loan for 
the borrower that provides collateral.  
In model 4 test, the result shows that the country risk variable is significant in 
1% level with a positive coefficient. It means that the country risk variable have a 
significant and positive relationship with syndicated loans. We can conclude that in a 
high country risk rate, the lead arranger will tend to syndicate the loan, since the lead 
arranger believe that a high country risk rate also represent a high credit risk of the 
borrower. The result in model 4 test supports the theory by Lyland and Pyle (1977), 
that the lead arranger will form a portfolio diversification when they are facing a high 
risk business condition.  
The other significant results from model 4 are for control tenor variable and 
secured. The control tenor variable is significant in 10% level, with a negative 
coefficient. The result shows that there is a significant negative relationship between 
control tenor variable and number variable. The lead arranger prefer to form a bigger 
size of syndicated loans if the payment settlement period is shorter. It is supporting 
the statement from Dennis, Mullineaux (1999) that a shorter payment settlement 
period will cause the lead arranger to syndicate the loan, since the monitoring level 
will also increase if the borrower asks for a payment settlement period extension.  
The significant test result in 1% level with a positive coefficient on model 4 
also shows that there is a positive significant relationship between control secured 
and number variables. The result support Bester (1985), Besanko, Thakor (1987), 
statement that the lead arranger will prefer to syndicate the loan if the borrower did 
not provide collateral. 
 
Table 5.2 
Inverensial Statistic data on syndicated loans 
 dependen variable : number 
Variables 
Regression 
Coeficients 
(model3) 
Regression 
Coeficients 
(model4) 
Z-Value 
(model3) 
Z-Value 
(model4) 
CPI 0.062442 - 0.564083 - 
count risk - 0.475171*** - 2,826633 
L_amount 0.450219 0.434747 1,536461 1,459369 
Ticker 0.505709 0.526318 1,016934 1,069779 
Tenor  -0.008310 -0.010534* -1,444962 -1,831713 
Secured 1.699823*** 1.577825*** 2,970244 2,82971 
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T2000 2.339462*** 2.413102*** 3,498688 3,647356 
t2001 2.378359*** 2.270099*** 3,088182 2,921186 
T2002 0.461827 0.717822 0,65836 1,048804 
T2003 -1.057.478 -0.703283 -1,329114  -0.889255 
in_1 0.016310 -0.112024 0.012344  -0.088331 
in_2 0.938917 0.947340 0.717283 0.737308 
in_3 1,743595 2.157277* 1,399007 1,727318 
in_4  -0.097270 0.101942  -0.083832 0.089338 
in_5 0.925784 1.622.047 0.520035 0.931031 
in_6 -2,183588 -2.030.318 -1,508724 -1,489916 
in_7 1,065478 1.171.984 0.516015 0.513595 
in_8  -0.001008 0.122625  -0.000452 0.051903 
Note : *significant 10% ; ** significant 5% ; *** significant 1%. 
 
The conclusion for model 1 and 2 tests, shows that the lead arranger decision 
whether to syndicate a loan or not, is highly depend on certification effect 
consideration, as stated by Jones, et al (2000) and Dennis, Mullineaux  (1999), which 
could impact the future reputation of the lead arranger. For this reason, the lead 
arranger will syndicate the loan with a low credit risk and moral hazard rate.  
The conclusion for model 3 test is insignificant, with a positive coefficient, 
which shows the tendency that the lead arranger decision on syndicate size 
determination also affected by certification effect as in the results on model 1 and 2. 
But the test result on model 4 shows that if the lead arranger is facing a choice of a 
high credit risk loan then they will form a bigger size syndicate as stated by Lyland 
and Pyle (1977).  
This situation also raises a question about why the lenders still want to join the 
syndicate eventhough they know that a high credit risk is involved. The answer could 
be because the lenders motivations to earn a higher return as a trade off for a higher 
risk condition. 
 
D.3. The Robusnest Check test result 
The result for robustnest check could be seen in table 5.3. Robustnest check is a 
test to support the main result in this research using software eviews, with a simple 
linear regression formula. 
The test result in model 5 shows that the CPI variable is insignificant with a 
negative coefficient. It means that there is no significant relationship between fee 
variable and CPI variable, while the negative coefficient means that if the moral 
hazard of the borrower is high and the CPI rate is low, then the lenders will demand a 
bigger fee to the borrower, vice versa. 
While the test result in model 6 shows that the country risk variable is 
significant in 1% level with a positive coefficient. It means that there is a significant 
relationship between country risk variable with fee variable. In a situation where the 
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high country risk index also represents the credit risk of the borrower, then the 
lenders will demand for a bigger fee to the borrower, and if the country risk index is 
low, then the lenders will demand a smaller fee from the borrower. 
  
Table 5.3 
Inferensial Statistic data on robustnest check 
 
 
 
 
The test result on model 7 shows that the CPI variable is significant in 5% level 
with a negative coefficient. It means that there is a significant relationship between 
CPI variable and rate variable, while the negative coefficient describe the negative 
relationship between CPI variable and rate variable. When the lead arranger is facing 
a situation with a high moral hazard of the borrower, represent by the low CPI rate in 
a country, then the lenders will demand a higher interest rate and vice versa. 
The last test in model 8 shows that the country risk variable has a significant 
relationship in 1% level with a positive coefficient. It shows the significant positive 
relationship between country risk variable and rate variable, which means if a high 
credit risk is represented by a high country risk of a country, then the lenders will 
demand a higer pricing of syndicated loans. From the robustnest check test results on 
model 5, model 6, model 7, and model 8, we can conclude that in a situation where 
the lenders are facing a higher risk syndicated loan, in terms of moral hazard risk or 
credit risk, the lenders will demand a higher return to compensate the risk they are 
facing. 
 
E. Conclusion 
The test result for all loan transaction sample in Asia since 1999 until 2003, 
describe that the lead arranger decision making to syndicate the loan, highly related to 
the risk factor implied. One of the risks is the moral hazard risk, in this research 
represented by CPI and the country risk of Asian countries. It means that the lead 
arranger will prefer to syndicate the loan in a situation where the CPI rate index is 
high with a low country risk rate, rather than in a situation where the CPI rate index is 
low with a high country risk rate. This consideration is to maintain the lead arranger’s 
reputation and to earn a higher certification effect in syndicated loans. 
The same thing applies for the lead arranger decision on size determination in 
loans transaction in Asia during 1999-2003. The CPI is not a significant factor that 
could affect the lead arranger decision on syndicated loans, but if we analyze the 
coefficient then we could conclude that if the borrower has a high moral hazard issue 
  Fee Rate 
Variabel model 5 model 6 model 7 model 8 
CPI 0,4861 - 0,0396** - 
  -0,697472 - -2,067951 - 
countrisk - 0,0028*** - 0,0012*** 
  - 3,017661 - 3,276429 
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showed by the CPI rate of the borrower home country, then the lead arranger will 
tend to form a smaller size syndicate. This result is not aligned with the country risk 
research, where the country risk will affect the lead arranger decision to determine the 
size of syndicated loans. For a higher country risk, the lead arranger will form a 
bigger size of syndicate. The result on country risk research is supporting the theory 
of risk diversification in syndicated loans, and also raises a question about why the 
lenders still want to join the syndicate eventhough they know that a high credit risk is 
involved. The answer could be because the lenders motivations to earn a higher return 
as a trade off for a higher risk condition. 
The robustnest check also confirmed the possibility that the lenders motivations 
are to earn a higher return as a trade off for a higher risk condition. We can conclude 
that a low CPI rate with a high country risk rate will cause the lead arranger to 
demand a higher return fee and interest. But since the test for CPI is insignificant, 
with a positive coefficient, means that there is an indication that the lead arranger will 
ask for a higher fee when they are facing a lower CPI rate.  
 
A. Implication 
From this research, we could conclude that there is an important results that 
could affect the government policy in banking sector. It is proven that the lenders 
value the risk factor when they invest in a syndicated loan, since they will demand a 
higher fee for a higher risk loan, and the fee will decreases for a lower risk loan. This 
situation means that during economy crisis in banking sector, the government should 
not issue a policy to bailout certain bank that being a lender for a high risk loan. 
Another important result is that the researchers could use macro economic 
variable to analyze micro economic condition, so that in a further research, the 
dimension will not only focusing on micro economic variable.  
 
B. Recommendation 
For further research analysis, the researcher should assest lead arranger 
proportion variable in syndicated loan, with more comprahensive and updated data. 
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